陳雲 :憑籍2046年的 《基本法》 永續的契機，中港之間可以用談判 確認香港的 實然主權
陳雲 : 大陸可與香港 建立 “ 華夏邦聯 ”
Chin Wan :A Federation for Hong Kong and China
陳雲 2015年6月15日
香港——圍繞著香港領導人在2017年應以何種方式選舉的爭論再次爆發。本周晚些時候，本地立法會將會就中國政府提出的一個爭議性方案進行投票。這一方案去年秋天激起了“雨傘運動”，導致城中的幾大街區被示威者長時間佔領。
按照中國政府提出的方案，香港行政長官的候選人要先經過一個由其親自挑選的提名委員會的篩查。香港的民主派認為，這種篩查制度讓北京向港人做出的普選最高官員的承諾形同虛設。
當北京拿“一國兩制”來說明其自身立場的合理性的時候，是在指向香港的獨特性，同時又佯裝這片地區不過是大陸下屬的又一座普通城市而已。然而，這兩套體制有著天壤之別，不能容於同一個國家，而兩者之間的關係必須重新界定。
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到了1997年英國將香港移交給北京的時候，這片土地已有逾150年不屬於中國的一部分。在此期間，中國大陸經歷了一小段共和時期，隨後是較長時間的共產黨執政時期。除了許多政治上的變遷，它還拋棄了華夏正統的宗教習俗、漢字傳統的書寫方法和粵語等漢語本土語言的古典讀音。然而，在香港，這些東西得以保留，乃至發揚光大。
近20年後，香港和中國大陸之間的文化差距已不是古怪有趣的地域差異，而是代表了對華夏正統的不同闡釋。今天的香港文化比中國大陸的文化更為現代，也更接近華夏正統——或者說是更多地植根于古老傳統。
這一點，再加上香港業已享有的相對自治，有著重大的政治含義。儘管香港在名義上是中華人民共和國的一個特別行政區，但實際上更像是個聯盟性質的實體。香港和中國大陸將來也理應這樣彼此相待：在一個同時包含港澳臺和中國大陸的正式華夏邦聯中，成為相互平等的成員。
香港的獨特性在很大程度上要歸因於英國殖民。1925到1926年間，不遠處的廣州發生大罷工，吸引了逾25萬港人聲援。港督金文泰(Cecil Clementi)意識到，這種防禦性愛國情緒可能會令這片殖民地的臣民與大陸同胞聯繫在一起。為了防止這種情況的發生，他引入了促進當地傳統文化的政策——比如聘用在中華民國不得志的前清官員和學者，讓他們在香港的新公立院校教授中華國學典籍。
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在共產黨於1949年上臺後，香港的這項文化復興政策變得更為明瞭。香港殖民當局宣導在正式場合中採用粵語，而不是官話、客家話或潮州話，從而將粵語從市井語言提升至學校用語，後來又使之進入了司法和立法系統。殖民當局還保留了華夏宗教與民間習俗，向外來遊客宣揚它們代表了古老的中國。
與此同時，大批大陸人湧入香港：根據某些統計，1945年到1953年間，香港人口從60萬左右增至逾200萬，而隨著共產化的中國推行集體所有制，移民人數持續攀升。大批逃難者來自滬寧京津地區，而這些地方當時在商業、教育、藝術和大眾娛樂方面比起香港來要更為前衛。將現代氣息帶到香港極為傳統的廣東文化氛圍中的同時，他們也在這片地方的言論自由和基本開放的文化中找到了一個適合自我表達的安全港。到了70年代，大批移民湧入造成的經濟衝擊基本得以消化之後，這種族群的融合孕育出了一批獨特的文化產品，比如功夫片。
英中之間於1984年簽署的協議規定了香港1997年交接的事宜，並對它在其後50年享有的地位做了安排，其中承認並維護香港的這種獨特的文化身份，以及它在英國人治下獲得的實質性自治。這份名為《中英聯合聲明》的協議呼籲為香港起草一部准憲法，也就是後來的《基本法》。《基本法》正式界定了“一國兩制”的概念，並規定“行政長官……最終達至由一個有廣泛代表性的提名委員會按民主程序提名後普選產生的目標”。
只是，“一國兩制”的概念 有些不當，而且明顯是一種策略。中華人民共和國雖然被正式認可為一個國家——在聯合國擁有席位，甚至在安理會還有否決權——但它卻名不副實。這個國家沒有民主，只有名義上的憲政，人權保護也得不到保障。它已經偏離了鑄造文化統一的民族共和國的軌道。中華人民共和國與其說是實際的存在，不如說是一種追求：它是中國共產黨兜售的政治概念，是一種控制手段，也是對其自身合法性的宣示。中華人民共和國更像一個政黨國家，而非民族國家。
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香港自身則有一些國家的特徵。它有自己的護照、貨幣、貨幣儲備、關稅制度和法律制度。有些國際機構如世界貿易組織 ( World Trade Organization )，將香港作為中國之外的獨立成員對待。甚至北京政府有時也將香港當作另一個國家：中國大陸的投資法把香港投資者看作國外投資者；中國政府也在其年度統計中將來自香港的投資算作國外投資。
文藝復興時期出現的漢薩同盟的城邦是現代歐洲國家的基礎，同樣，現在處於准國家狀態的香港也可被看做是華夏邦聯的前身。
這一構想並不像它聽起來的那麼不切實際。香港是中國歷史上第一個通過與北京政府締結協議（即《基本法》）取得極大自治權的地方政府。雖然這一協議到2047年才會失效，香港和中國很快就必須就此重新展開談判。香港的經濟活力有賴於其投資環境的穩定和可預見性，很多按揭和其他金融工具都有30年的有效期，意味著它們的基本參數至少要在2017年之前確定。
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北京政府不會簡單地續用原先的《基本法》：之前約定的50年期限實際是一種試用期。另一方面，中國政府也不能在2047年直接接管香港。最近幾年，它越來越多地以一種半隱密的形式控制著香港的高官、資本、地產、主流媒體和大學管理人員。但它不能全盤控制香港，損害它作為擁有法治的國際金融中心的聲譽。
如今，北京政府拒絕給予香港更多民主自由，因為，歸根結底它擔心香港會因此在未來要求完全自治。所以與其在民主問題上陷入僵局，不如直面潛在的主權問題，而建立正式的華夏邦聯則可以緩解北京政府的憂慮——最終因香港獨立而失去它。
主權問題一旦解決，就可以更冷靜地討論邦聯中的成員各自選擇何種社會制度。那時，這種討論的風險就會減低，香港取得真正的民主制度的機會也會更大。
建立華夏邦聯對中國也是好事。它可以幫北京解決香港問題，還可以以此方式一併解決臺灣問題。既然邦聯中的各個成員可以選擇各自的治理制度，香港地區獲得更多民主也就不意味著大陸也要如此。允許香港按照香港人的意願發展，也有助於中國政府在大陸維持現狀。
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陳雲：陳雲文章 在New York Times出現。香港城邦論及華夏邦聯論，第一次在英文媒體發表，而且是鼎鼎大名的美國《紐約時報》。
這篇1400字的英文文章，解釋香港文化 在金文泰總督的古文教育之下，保存華夏正統，並且在戰後吸納華北 與江南的精英文人 及企業家，在香港形成南北匯通、中西共融的華夏天下。
香港城邦的《基本法》也是首先在華夏大地上的中央與地方/附庸國的 立憲文件，憑籍2046年的《基本法》永續的契機，中港之間可以用談判確認香港的實然主權，協助華夏締造邦聯政體，首次解決滿蒙帝國（清朝）留下的文化建國問題。
這篇文章，在目前任何華文報刊無法刊登，卻在英文《紐約時報》刊登了！
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Wan Chin 香港城邦論正式進入美國主流媒體。請各位把握機會廣傳，給朋友閱讀，並且發布到港僑群組。
多謝各位歷年來的支持。城邦論進入國際舞台了！
Wan Chin 這篇文章，是以天下情懷寫的。華夏邦聯是美國上佳的China engagement policy，而且是一個fair game to all. 我是世界和平主義者。
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Chin Wan :A Federation for Hong Kong and China
HONG KONG — The debate over how Hong Kong’s leader should be elected in 2017 has flared up again. Later this week the local legislature is expected to vote on a controversial plan by the Chinese government — the one that triggered the Umbrella Movement and the lengthy occupation of several major neighborhoods in the city last fall.
The Chinese government proposes that candidates for the position of Hong Kong chief executive be preselected by a handpicked nomination committee. Democrats in Hong Kong argue that this vetting system guts Beijing’s promise to Hong Kongers that they would get to elect their top official by universal suffrage.
When Beijing invokes “one country-two systems” to justify its position, it is gesturing at Hong Kong’s uniqueness while pretending that the territory is just another subordinate municipality of the mainland. But these two systems are too different to belong to the same country, and their relationship must be redefined.
By the time the British handed Hong Kong over to Beijing in 1997, this territory hadn’t been a part of China for more than 150 years. In the interim, mainland China experienced a short republican rule and a longer Communist regime. In addition to undergoing many political changes, it abandoned orthodox religious customs, traditional written Chinese and the classical pronunciation of local Chinese languages like Cantonese. In Hong Kong, however, those things were preserved, even nurtured.
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Almost two decades later, the cultural differences between Hong Kong and mainland China are more than quaint local variations; they represent competing claims to Chinese identity. Hong Kong’s culture today is both more modern and more authentically Chinese — or more rooted in ancient traditions — than the culture of mainland China.
This, combined with the relative autonomy Hong Kong already enjoys, has major political implications. While officially a special administrative region within the People’s Republic of China, Hong Kong really is more like a federate entity. And that is how Hong Kong and mainland China should treat each other in the future: as equal members of a formal Chinese confederation, also including Macau and Taiwan.
Hong Kong’s peculiarity owes much to British colonialism. When in 1925-1926 an extended workers strike in nearby Guangzhou drew more than 250,000 sympathetic Hong Kongers, Governor Cecil Clementi realized that a form of defensive patriotism risked pushing the colony’s subjects to associate with their Chinese compatriots on the mainland. To ward that off, he introduced policies fostering traditional local culture — for example, hiring former Manchu officials and scholars who had fallen out of favor in Republican China to teach Chinese classics in Hong Kong’s new government schools and universities.
This policy of cultural revivalism became even clearer after the Communist Party took over China in 1949. The colonial authorities in Hong Kong favored the use of Cantonese over Mandarin, Hakka and Chiu Chow in official contexts, elevating the language from the streets to the schools, then the courts and Parliament. They also preserved Chinese religions and folk customs, touting them to foreign tourists as representing Old China.
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Meanwhile, a huge influx of mainlanders moved to Hong Kong: By some accounts the city’s population grew from about 600,000 to more than two million between 1945 and 1953, and it continued to increase as collectivization was implemented in Communist China. A significant number of refugees came from Shanghai, Ningbo, Beijing and Tianjin, cities that were avant-garde compared to Hong Kong in business, education, fine arts and mass entertainment. While they brought modernity to Hong Kong’s hyper-traditional Cantonese culture, they found in the territory’s free press and generally open culture a haven for self-expression. By the 1970s — after the economic shock caused by this massive exodus had largely been absorbed — this mixing of peoples was breeding idiosyncratic cultural products, like Kung Fu movies.
This distinctive cultural identity as well as the de facto autonomy Hong Kong had acquired under the British were recognized and protected in the 1984 treaty between Britain and China that defined the terms of Hong Kong’s handover in 1997 and the territory’s status for 50 years after that. The 1984 Joint Declaration called for the creation of a Basic Law, a quasi-constitution, for Hong Kong. The Basic Law formalized the “one country-two systems” concept, and stated as an “ultimate aim,” “the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures.”
Only the concept of “one country-two systems” is a misnomer and a transparent ploy. The P.R.C., though officially recognized as a country — with a seat at the United Nations, and even a veto on the Security Council — falls short of the designation. It has no democracy, constitutional rule in name only, and human rights protections that are not enforced. Its attempt to create a national republic with a unitary Chinese culture has gone off track. The P.R.C. as a nation is a concept more aspirational than organic: a political construct peddled by the Chinese Communist Party as a means of control and a claim to legitimacy. The P.R.C. is a party-state rather than a nation-state.
Hong Kong, for its part, has some of the trappings of statehood. It has its own passport, its own currency, its own monetary reserve, its own customs regime, its own legal system. Some international bodies, like the World Trade Organization, treat it as a member in its own right, separately from China. Even Beijing sometimes lapses into treating Hong Kong like another country: The investment law of mainland China deems Hong Kong investors to be foreign; in its annual statistics the Chinese government counts investment from Hong Kong as foreign.
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Though China has brazenly broken promises concerning HK's government, only a threat of great power would swerve it from continuing...
Federation-style nations/entities - or Co-federations, either work by coming close (as they did in the US and Australia) or they move apart,...
Despite 150 years of colonial rule, Hong Kong only started to take off economically in the last 40 years of colonial rule. Before 1949, Hong...
Much like the city-states of the Hanseatic League during the Renaissance were building blocks in the formation of modern European states, the quasi-state that is Hong Kong today is best understood as a precursor of a Chinese confederation to come.
This idea is not as fanciful as it may sound. Hong Kong is the first regional government in the history of China to have gained a significant measure of autonomy through a contractual arrangement with Beijing: the Basic Law. And though that deal is not set to expire until 2047, Hong Kong and China will have to renegotiate it very soon. Hong Kong’s economic viability hinges on the stability and predictability of its investment climate, and many mortgages and other financial instruments have 30-year terms, meaning that their basic parameters have to be known by 2017 at the latest.
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Beijing will not simply renew the Basic Law: The text’s 50-year term was meant as a probation. On the other hand, the Chinese government cannot just take over Hong Kong in 2047. In recent years, it has increasingly exercised a semi-clandestine form of control over Hong Kong’s top officials, capital, real estate, mainstream media and university administration. But it cannot go all the way and jeopardize Hong Kong’s reputation as an international financial hub that operates smoothly and under the rule of law.
Beijing resists granting Hong Kong more democratic freedoms today because, at bottom, it fears that would encourage Hong Kongers to demand complete autonomy one day. So rather than continue deadlocking over the question of democracy, better to address head-on the underlying sovereignty issue — and creating a formal Chinese confederation would relieve Beijing from worrying that it may eventually lose Hong Kong to independence.
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With the sovereignty matter resolved, a calmer discussion could be had about which political systems would govern each entity in the confederation. The stakes of that debate would be lower then, and Hong Kong’s chances at obtaining proper democracy would be greater.
Establishing a Chinese confederation would also be good for China. It would solve Beijing’s Hong Kong problem, and by the same token, could solve its Taiwan problem, too. And since each entity in the confederation could have its own system of governance, more democracy for Hong Kong would not necessarily mean more democracy for the mainland. Allowing Hong Kong to become what its people want it to be would also help the Chinese government keep mainland China as it is.
Chin Wan is assistant professor of Chinese at Lingnan University in Hong Kong and the founder of the Hong Kong Resurgence Order.
source :
陳雲 : 大陸可與香港 建立 “ 華夏邦聯 ”
http://m.cn.nytimes.com/opinion/20150615/c15edchin/
陳雲 :憑籍2046年的《基本法》永續的契機，中港之間可以用談判確認香港的 實然主權
https://www.facebook.com/wan.chin.75/posts/10153323269632225
Chin Wan :A Federation for Hong Kong and China
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/15/opinion/a-federation-for-hong-kong-and-china.html?_r=2
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